Microsoft Next-Generation Secure Computing Base Documentation


Recommended Posts

I had originally planned to create a post in the 2014 Random Text Thread with links to these documents, but I realized that they would reach a much broader audience if they were posted here. This topic aims to foster discussion and promote awareness of Microsoft's Next-Generation Secure Computing Base architecture.

As you may remember, Microsoft had intended to ship NGSCB with its Windows "Longhorn" operating system. Unlike the other "major" technologies slated for Windows "Longhorn" - such as Avalon (WPF), Indigo (WCF), and WinFS - NGSCB was not built on the then fairly new .NET Framework, which places it in a unique position. This strongly suggests that it could have made it into Windows Vista (and thus subsequent versions) if it had not been for the negative perception surrounding the technology - indeed, one of the main architects of the technology has stated that this was the main reason why it was cancelled. This is such a disappointment to me, as both Android and Apple have recently adopted similar technologies when it was Microsoft that was innovative.
 
Intel Developer Forum 2003
A Privacy Friendly Method for Assuring Trust (PDF)
An Opt-In Strategy for a Safer Computing Platform (PDF)
LaGrande Technology & Safer Computing Overview (PDF)
Migrating Applications to NGSCB (PDF)
Next-Generation Secure Computing Base: Nexus Fundamentals (PDF)
Recovering from Computer Failures, If TPMs Go Bad (PDF)
Software for LaGrande Technology: Impact to the Software Development Process (PDF)
TCG Credentials: Their Role in the Trust Infrastructure and Manufacturing (PDF)
Trusted Computing Group and the TPM 1.2 Specification (PDF)
Trusted Mobile Keyboard Controller Architecture (PDF)
Trusted Platform Module: Impact to Manufacturing & Testing (PDF)
 
Microsoft Content Security Business Unit
Microsoft Palladium: A Business Overview (PDF)
 
Microsoft NGSCB Technical Documentation
A Technical Introduction to NGSCB (PPT)
Building a Secure Platform for Trusted Computing (DOC)
Hardware Platform for the Next-Generation Secure Computing Base (DOC)
Privacy Enhancements in the Next-Generation Secure Computing Base (DOC)
Secure User Authentication for NGSCB (DOC)
Security Model for the Next-Generation Secure Computing Base (DOC)
Trusted Computing Base and Software Authentication (DOC)

Microsoft NGSCB Website
Microsoft Shared Source Initiative Homepage (HTML)
The Next-Generation Secure Computing Base: An Overview (HTML)
The Next-Generation Secure Computing Base: Four Key Features (HTML)

Microsoft PressPass
Microsoft "Palladium" - A Business Overview (HTML)
Q&A: Microsoft Seeks Industry-Wide Collaboration for "Palladium" Initiative (HTML)
Trustworthy Computing From Fingertips to Eyeballs (HTML)

Microsoft Research
A Logical Account of NGSCB (PDF)
John Manferdelli: Next-Generation Secure Computing Base (PPT)
NGSCB: A Trusted Open System (PDF) (PDF link #2)

Microsoft TechNet
Microsoft Next-Generation Secure Computing Base Technical FAQ (HTML)

National Institutes of Standards and Technology (NIST)
Microsoft ?Palladium? (PDF)

PDC 2003
Next-Generation Secure Computing Base: Development Considerations for Nexus Computing Agents (HTML) (HTML link #2)
Next-Generation Secure Computing Base ? Overview and Drilldown (PPT)
 
WinHEC 2000
Privacy, Security, and Content in Windows Platforms (PPT)

WinHEC 2001
Privacy, Security, and Content in Windows Platforms (PPT)

WinHEC 2003
At WinHEC 2003, Microsoft Discusses Details of Next-Generation Secure Computing Base (HTML)

WinHEC 2003 Self Extracting ZIP Archives (Contain PowerPoint Slides)
Building a Next-Generation Secure Computing Base PC (EXE)
Ecosystem and Opportunities with NGSCB (EXE)
Industry Perspectives on NGSCB (EXE)
Microsoft Directions on Security (EXE)
Platform Enhancements for Trustworthy Computing (EXE)
Security Model for NGSCB (EXE)
Technical Introduction to NGSCB (EXE)
Trusted Graphics and NGSCB (EXE)
User Authentication in NGSCB (EXE)

WinHEC 2004 PowerPoint Slides
Next-Generation Secure Computing Base (PPT)
Securing the Input Path on NGSCB Systems (PPT)
TPM 1.2 ? Trusted Platform Module and its Use in NGSCB (PPT)
 
Microsoft France
NGSCB: Une Introduction (PPT)

  • 1 month later...
  • 2 weeks later...

about TrustZone, wheres the security when you can just dump the secure kernel in plaintext from the rom, then go through it and exploit all the bugs? there are instances of people doing this to unlock the bootloaders, for example.

 

And NGSCB relies on TPM to verify the kernel hash. you know how i feel about TPM.

  On 01/09/2014 at 05:30, vcfan said:

about TrustZone, wheres the security when you can just dump the secure kernel in plaintext from the rom, then go through it and exploit all the bugs? there are instances of people doing this to unlock the bootloaders, for example.

But how many people know how to do this?

 

  On 01/09/2014 at 05:30, vcfan said:
And NGSCB relies on TPM to verify the kernel hash. you know how i feel about TPM.

Correct. The TPM measures the hash of the Nexus and stores it within a Platform Configuration Register.

(I love that you know this, not many would care).

  On 01/09/2014 at 05:37, Ian William said:

But how many people know how to do this?

look at all the vulnerabilities that are discovered every day for all products. there are plenty of individuals capable of finding these holes. all is needed is only one person to release a proof of concept,and bam, every c coder on the planet can make the cpu do whatever they want it to do.

 

  On 01/09/2014 at 05:37, Ian William said:

Correct. The TPM measures the hash of the Nexus and stores it within a Platform Configuration Register.

(I love that you know this, not many would care).

thanks.

i think even if you had a the most secure, unbreakable TPM, that wouldn't even spell the end of such hacking attempt. lets say the trusted kernel was launched and passed the hash checks.

we know of a few known facts.

1. we can read the trusted kernel code at our will (disassemblies)

2. normal mode and trusted mode exchange data using the nexus manager.

see the problem here? we know exactly how the kernel behaves, and we have the power to craft the data that we send in such a way that its possible to break something and make the trusted kernel do something it was not meant to do.

  On 01/09/2014 at 05:04, Ian William said:

I am curious why you feel this way. Would you care to elaborate?

Because of locked bootloaders and last I checked they haven't found an exploit for my phone yet.

  On 01/09/2014 at 06:05, vcfan said:

look at all the vulnerabilities that are discovered every day for all products. there are plenty of individuals capable of finding these holes. all is needed is only one person to release a proof of concept,and bam, every c coder on the planet can make the cpu do whatever they want it to do.

True, but as you said this is not exclusive to TrustZone. There isn't a product in the world that is invulnerable.

 

  On 01/09/2014 at 06:05, vcfan said:

thanks.

 

No, thank you. I believe that the lack of information about the technology is one of the reasons that it is not appreciated. On top of that, there are some who just are not interested in that sort of thing, so you can just imagine my delight when I saw your response!

 

  On 01/09/2014 at 06:05, vcfan said:

see the problem here? we know exactly how the kernel behaves, and we have the power to craft the data that we send in such a way that its possible to break something and make the trusted kernel do something it was not meant to do.

Would you be willing to provide some examples? Microsoft strongly emphasized NGSCB's ability to thwart software based attacks.

 

  On 02/09/2014 at 21:05, MASTER260 said:

Because of locked bootloaders and last I checked they haven't found an exploit for my phone yet.

To each his own. I happen to have an affinity for locked bootloaders.

This topic is now closed to further replies.
  • Posts

    • This 2TB NVMe Gen4 SSD is priced just $94 and you also get a free 64GB UHS-I memory card by Sayan Sen A few days ago, we reported on Team Group's T-FORCE G50 4TB NVMe SSD that was up for grabs at just $200 thanks to a promo coupon. Sadly, that deal has expired although you can still WD's SN8100 (Gen5) and SN7100 (Gen4) offerings as they are still running the discount. If you don't have the budget for those or are shopping for lower capacity drives then Crucial's T500 Gen4 drive discount is still live, and you can get them for just $125. And while the G50 4TB deal has expired, Team Group is now offering its 2TB model at its lowest ever price and you also get a free Micro SD card with it. The Team Group G50 is also a TLC (triple level cell) NAND flash SSD, and thus the endurance on the T-FORCE SSD is quite good, as it is rated for 1300 TBW (terabytes written) for the 2TB variant. Its MTBF, or Mean Time Between Failure, is claimed at 3,000,000 hours. The operating temperature is 0~70 C. The G50 does not have a dedicated DRAM cache (only the G50 Pro SKUs have it), but since it is based on NVMe version 1.4 which supports HMB (host memory buffer) technology; thus, the drive can use system memory for caching. In terms of performance, Team Group promises sequential read and write speeds of up to 5000 MB/s and 4500 MB/s, respectively. However, the firm does not disclose random throughput metrics. Get the Team Group G50 at the link below (deal is said to be ending in less than 10 hours): Team Group T-FORCE G50 SSD (TM8FFE002T0C129) + Team Group 64GB Elite microSDXC UHS-I U3, V30, A1, Micro SD with SD Adapter, to 100MB/s (TEAUSDX64GIV30A103): $105.99 + $12 off with promo code SSETA665 (Shipped and Sold by Newegg US) This Amazon deal is US-specific and not available in other regions unless specified. If you don't like it or want to look at more options, check out the Amazon US deals page here. Get Prime (SNAP), Prime Video, Audible Plus or Kindle / Music Unlimited. Free for 30 days. As an Amazon Associate, we earn from qualifying purchases.
    • I know what you're getting at, but Microsoft themselves have said that the Xbox Ally specifically disables a bunch of stuff from Windows to improve performance and save 2GB of memory. And that special game mode is coming to Windows 11 next year.
    • It could be good old fashion neglect, lower priority focus, less resources then it use to vs active sabotage.
  • Recent Achievements

    • First Post
      Ian_ earned a badge
      First Post
    • Explorer
      JaviAl went up a rank
      Explorer
    • Reacting Well
      Cole Multipass earned a badge
      Reacting Well
    • Reacting Well
      JLP earned a badge
      Reacting Well
    • Week One Done
      Rhydderch earned a badge
      Week One Done
  • Popular Contributors

    1. 1
      +primortal
      647
    2. 2
      ATLien_0
      268
    3. 3
      Michael Scrip
      218
    4. 4
      +FloatingFatMan
      184
    5. 5
      Steven P.
      145
  • Tell a friend

    Love Neowin? Tell a friend!