Privacy groups are calling for transparency in Apple’s legal fight against a secret UK government order that would force the company to weaken its encryption. The Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) is set to hear Apple’s appeal on March 14, but rights organizations argue that such a significant case should not be handled behind closed doors.
The order in question demands that Apple create a technical capability, essentially a backdoor, allowing UK authorities to access encrypted iCloud data. Apple has already responded by pulling its Advanced Data Protection (ADP) feature for UK users, but it remains unclear if this move satisfies the government’s demands. The Open Rights Group, Big Brother Watch, and Index on Censorship have jointly written to the IPT, urging it to hold the hearing in public.
This case implicates the privacy rights of millions of British citizens who use Apple’s technology, as well as Apple’s international users. There is significant public interest in knowing when and on what basis the UK government believes that it can compel a private company to undermine the privacy and security of its customers.
The groups argue that the case does not meet the legal threshold for secrecy, emphasizing that the surveillance order is already widely known. They state,
There are no good reasons to keep this hearing entirely private, not least for the fact that the existence of the TCN has already been widely reported and that Apple’s own actions in removing its Advanced Data Protection (ADP) feature for UK iCloud users leave no doubt as to what triggered them.
This is far from the first time Apple has faced pressure to weaken encryption. In 2016, the company refused to create a backdoor for the FBI during the San Bernardino case, warning that such a tool would inevitably be misused.
International legal precedents also lean in favor of Apple’s stance. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has ruled that weakening encryption impacts the rights of all users and is not proportionate to the aims of government surveillance. The Open Rights Group’s letter highlights this, stating,
An obligation to decrypt end-to-end encrypted communications risks amounting to a requirement that providers of such services weaken the encryption mechanism for all users; it is accordingly not proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued.
Rights groups are challenging the UK government’s push for secrecy, pointing out that the IPT itself has acknowledged that legal arguments should be heard in public when they are solely focused on interpreting the law and do not risk disclosing sensitive information.
They stress that the government’s usual policy of neither confirming nor denying (NCND) surveillance actions does not apply here, as this case involves a broad and already public attempt to weaken encryption for millions.
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